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Abstract 
We conduct an experiment to investigate how different information about social norms affects 
individuals’ stated contributions to a specific pro-environment program, a student “green 
fee,” in the context of a referendum. Compared to students that receive no information about 
peer contributions, on average, students that receive information about the dollar value 
range of contributions at peer institutions contribute less while students that learn about the 
high percentage of students voting “yes” on green fee programs at peer institutions contribute 
more. The results are economically significant as the absolute values of both effects represent 
approximately 25% of average contributions. These results suggest that information about 
participation rates can be more effective than information about dollar amounts in 
encouraging contributions to environmental initiatives. Of interest to stated preference 
researchers, we find that results do not change when controlling for self-selection into survey 
completion. 
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1    Introduction 
Previous research has uncovered multiple settings in which people tend to conform to a peer 
group’s participation in a pro-environmental behavior. For example, Goldstein et al. (2008) 
find that providing descriptive social norms motivate hotel guests to reuse their towels more 
effectively than providing information about environmental benefits. A group of studies finds 
that providing information to consumers about neighbors’ energy usage can reduce energy 
consumption (Allcott, 2011; Ayres et al., 2012; Nolan et al., 2008; Schultz et al., 2007). 
Similarly, information about others’ water usage can affect behavior (Ferraro et al., 2011; 
Ferraro et al., 2013). In each of these cases, individuals are choosing to behave in a more 
environmentally friendly manner because of a social norm. However, social norms in a given 
context can often be described in a variety of ways. Specifically, many behaviors can be 
described in terms of participation rates (extensive margin) or the intensity of participation 
(intensive margin). We seek to analyze which of these descriptors is more effective in 
motivating pro-social behavior. Therefore, our first contribution to the social norms literature 
is that we examine the effects of information about both the extensive and intensive qualities 
of a reference group’s behavior.1 
Moreover, in the real world, often the amount of a public good provided depends on a 
vote rather than a series of individual actions. For example, many countries, states, and 
localities decide referenda via the ballot on public policies including issues such as increased 
school funding, increased open space or trail ways, and increased fire or police services. 
Organizations spend vast amounts of money attempting to garner support for their 
referenda, often appealing to the social benefits of the policy. Perhaps information about 
social norms could be more persuasive. Thus, our second contribution to the social norms 
literature is that we examine the effects of information about a reference group’s contribution 
in the context of a referendum. Specifically, we investigate how differing types of information 
about a peer group’s behavior affect university students’ stated contributions for 
environmental improvement programs. 
There has recently been a push in the campus sustainability movement across the US. 
For example, 685 schools have signed on to the American College & University President’s 
                                                          
1 Throughout the manuscript, we use the term “extensive” as a measure of how many people 
participate in the behavior and the term “intensive” as a measure of how frequently or intensely 
people participate in a behavior. 
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Climate Commitment. Signatories commit to develop a plan to eliminate net greenhouse gas 
emissions. Other schools have investigated the possibility of joining the commitment but 
concerns about the costs of reducing carbon emissions during a period of increasing budgetary 
pressures have prevented signing. In turn, students at many institutions have searched for 
ways to fund environmentally focused programs such as the President’s Climate 
Commitment. The “green fee” has emerged as a partial solution at over 70 known colleges 
and universities. Through referenda, students establish a “green fund” from extra student 
fees that supports purchasing renewable energy produced off-campus and/or funding 
renewable energy and energy conservation projects on-campus.2 
We utilize a survey of 559 students at a U.S. Midwestern liberal arts university 
(hereafter MLAU) to test for differences in students’ reported contributions to “green fee” 
programs based upon the type of peer information provided. We test for effects from social 
norms information with a treatment that describes the range of green fee dollar values 
adopted at peer institutions (dollar value treatment), a treatment that describes both the 
number of institutions that have adopted green fees and the percentage of students at peer 
institutions that have voted “yes” to the implementation of green fees (extent of participation 
treatment), and a treatment that presents all of the information combined in the first two 
treatments (combination treatment). Each of these treatments is then tested against a 
control group that receives no information about peers. Under the assumption that any 
hypothetical bias in our stated preference surveys affects only levels but not differential 
responses to treatments, we find that information given about a peer group significantly 
impacts respondents’ reported contributions. Interestingly, the two types of information 
about social norms (extensive and intensive) have opposite effects on stated contributions. 
Both t-tests for difference in means between groups and regression analysis confirm 
that gaining information about the dollar value of peer green fee contributions results in a 
decrease in mean contributions of about $8 to $9 and gaining information about the high 
participation rate of peers in green fee programs at other institutions results in an increase 
in mean contributions of about $7 to $8. Presenting both pieces of information together into 
one treatment leads to no change in mean contributions relative to the control group.  
                                                          
2 The Association for the Advancement of Sustainability in Higher Education (AASHE) provides 
extensive information about higher education green fees in the United States (AASHE, Dedicated 
Student Fees for Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency). 
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A common concern with survey data is that the pool of respondents may not be 
representative of the population because individuals self-select into completing the survey. 
This can potentially bias the results in several areas including the stated contribution 
amount and the size of the treatment effects. Fortunately, we have access to several key 
variables about each individual in the domestic student population of MLAU and we can link 
this information to the completed surveys so we can build a model to explain the survey 
participation decision. Utilizing a Heckman sample selection model, we find that official 
grade point average, race/ethnicity, and gender associate significantly with the survey 
participation decision. However, the treatment effects are qualitatively similar between the 
models that do and do not control for sample selection. It may be reassuring to other stated 
preference researchers that there is little to no difference when accounting for the sample 
selection.  
 
2     Related Literature 
The power of social norms has been documented in a variety of contexts in the psychology 
literature. Steg and Vlek (2009) recognize the influence of social norms as one of the factors 
influencing environmental behavior. Two examples in an environmental context include 
Cialdini et al. (1990) and Cialdini et al. (2006). In this literature, descriptive social norms are 
described as, “informing individuals of what is likely to be effective or adaptive behavior in 
that situation” (Goldstein et al. 2008). This is very similar to the idea of “conformity” in the 
economics literature, where the more commonly accepted definition of conformity relates to 
a social phenomenon where individuals take cues from others as to what is acceptable 
behavior. For example, Bardsley and Sausgruber state that conformity, “involves perceiving 
others’ behavior as a guide to what is socially or morally appropriate. It therefore predicts 
that people may conform independently of the material consequences of doing so” (Bardsley 
and Sausgruber, 2005). A related phenomenon in the economics literature has been termed 
“reciprocity,” which predicts a matching behavior where individuals attempt to match others’ 
contribution levels. The distinction here is that reciprocity is driven by a desire to create 
fairness whereas conformity does not have its roots in a desire of fairness but rather in a 
desire to not deviate from the actions of others. 
Conformity and reciprocity are often difficult to separately identify because both 
motivators will give rise to “conditional cooperation,” which broadly states that individuals 
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contribute more to a public good when others also contribute. As pointed out by Frey and 
Meier (2004), there are at least three theoretical explanations that can explain the results of 
their study. People may want to conform to a social norm, people may desire fairness and 
hence exhibit reciprocity behavior, and contributions by others might signal the quality of 
the public good (Vesterlund, 2003). A group of field experiments have examined the extent of 
conditional cooperation in a variety of contexts including movie rating behavior (Chen et al., 
2010), contributions of students in Zurich to social funds supporting other students (Frey and 
Meier, 2004), contributions to a radio station (Shang and Croson, 2009; Croson and Shang, 
2008), contributions to cross-country track maintenance (Heldt, 2006), and museum 
donations to transparent boxes (Martin and Randal, 2008).  
The effect of information about a reference group’s contributions on stated 
contributions has not been studied as much. Alpizar et al. (2008) investigate whether 
information about the contributions matters more for hypothetical contributions than for 
actual contributions at a national park in Costa Rica. They state, “as far as we know, no 
previous study has looked directly at how information about the contributions of others 
affects stated contributions” (Alpizar et al., 2008). While they do find a substantial 
hypothetical bias, they do not find that the influence of peer information is larger for stated 
contributions compared to actual contributions. Hypothetical bias has also been documented 
in many environmental valuation studies.3 However, given that we are more interested in 
how the average contribution changes in response to differential information and are less 
concerned with the absolute baseline contribution amount we abstract from any hypothetical 
bias concerns. 
 
3    Survey Description 
Prior to conducting the survey, we held focus groups with 25 students to discuss their 
opinions about green fees and to learn the relevant range of contributions for the payment 
card portion of the survey. During October of 2011, we conducted a survey of 559 MLAU 
students. The entire MLAU student population, which is approximately 1850 students, was 
contacted via direct email solicitation making the response rate approximately 30 percent. 
Potential respondents were provided a link in the email to the online survey, hosted by 
                                                          
3 See Whitehead and Cherry (2007) for an overview of many studies documenting hypothetical bias 
and the approaches that researchers have taken to mitigate the bias. 
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SurveyGizmo. Respondents could only access the survey via the link in their email, which 
ensured that each respondent only completed the survey once. On the welcome page of the 
survey, respondents were informed that the purpose of the study is to find out how MLAU 
students view environmental issues and to gage the level of support for increasing funding 
for sustainability projects on campus. Respondents learned that the results of the survey 
would be shared with campus decision makers including the administration, faculty 
committees, and the MLAU Council on Student Affairs. As there was recent talk on campus 
about the President’s Climate Commitment and potential green fees, respondents had 
sufficient reason to take the hypothetical fee referendum seriously. 
In the introduction of the survey, students learn about the recent and current 
environmental initiatives on MLAU’s campus. The subsequent section gathers information 
about the respondents’ environmental awareness and extent of “green” behavior. These 
questions are important because they can potentially explain differences in willingness to 
contribute to a green fee. The second section of the survey informs MLAU students that 
MLAU recently received a B- from the College Sustainability Report Card and enumerates 
several of the components that contribute to that ranking.  This section also inquires about 
respondents’ priorities for environmental improvements on campus.  
The third section of the survey contains the green fee contribution question. After 
explaining what a green fee is, our contribution question is phrased as,  
 
Suppose a ballot initiative has been drafted to create a mandatory green fee for all 
students. Also, suppose that all students are given the opportunity to vote. The 
initiative will pass if it receives more “yes” votes than “no” votes. If passed, the 
initiative will establish a certain dollar amount per semester that each student will 
be required to pay in the form of a fee charged to your student account.  
 
What is the maximum dollar amount per semester for which you would vote "yes" on 
this referendum for a mandatory green fee? (Select one dollar amount)  
 
Please keep in mind your own personal financial situation and how the proposed fee 
would affect your personal budget. 
 
 Respondents then select a dollar amount from a payment card having fees ranging 
from $0 to $100 per semester in $5 increments.  
We randomly assign our sample into four groups (a control and three treatment 
groups). The control group receives no information about peer institutions. Treatment 1 
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(Dollar Value Treatment) describes the range of green fees adopted at peer institutions. The 
exact wording of the addition to the contribution question compared to the control group is, 
 
In recent years, students in many schools have voted to pay a certain amount of money 
along with their tuition to support the campus sustainability movement. The amount 
of fees charged at other universities ranges between $1 per credit of class to $80 per 
year.  
 
We gathered this information about the range of fees from AASHE. While presenting 
respondents with varying dollar amounts for the range would have increased the variation 
in our data and potentially facilitated a more precise estimate of this dollar value effect, we 
wanted to avoid providing respondents with false information. A certain percentage of 
students on campus is quite active environmentally and would plausibly know if we were 
lying to them about green fees at peer institutions. We wanted to limit the study to the effects 
from true information.  
 Treatment 2 (Extent of Participation Treatment) describes both the number of 
institutions that have adopted green fees and the percentage of students at peer institutions 
that have voted “yes” to the implementation of green fees. The exact wording of the addition 
to the contribution question compared to the control group is, 
 
In recent years, students in many schools have voted to pay a certain amount of money 
along with their tuition to support the campus sustainability movement. Today, there 
are more than 70 colleges and universities known to have student green fees. The 
number of institutions starting student green funds is steadily increasing.  
When put to a student referendum, on average, 85% of the student body at the known 
schools voted for passing the green fee referendum. For example, 85% of students 
from the College of William and Mary voted for the referendum, 77% of students from 
University of Illinois voted for "Yes", and 81% from Appalachian State University 
voted for "Yes". 
 
Again, this information was gathered from (AASHE). As with the previous treatment, we 
considered varying the number of green fee institutions and the percentage of the student 
body voting yes. However, we decided that it was preferable to avoid introducing any false 
information to the survey. 
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Treatment 3 (Combination Treatment) combines the information from Treatment 1 
and Treatment 2. That is, respondents receive information both on the dollar value and the 
extent of participation at peer institutions.4 
As a follow-up question to all of the groups, we ask respondents how certain they are 
that their vote will influence student green fee policy at MLAU. The fourth and final section 
of the survey collects confidential demographic information. 
 
4    Data and Descriptive Analysis 
As previously stated, 559 respondents completed the survey. Summary statistics for all 
variables are given in Table 1 and a description of all variables is in Appendix A. For 
comparison, the overall MLAU student population is roughly 46 percent male, ten percent 
international, and 25 percent varsity athletes. As seen in Table 1, approximately forty 
percent of the sample completed the control version and twenty percent of the sample 
completed one of the three treatment versions.5 As a starting point, we break the sample into 
the control and three treatment groups to get a sense of how the treatments affect 
contribution levels.  We reject the null that the means of the four groups are jointly equal (p-
value = 0.0002). Table 2 reports the results for the t-tests for difference in means between 
the control and treatment groups. In each case, the relevant treatment group is tested against 
the control group. We find that Treatment 1 (Dollar Value) has a significantly lower mean 
contribution than the control group and Treatment 2 (Extent of Participation) has a 
significantly higher mean contribution that the control group. The mean of Treatment 3 
(Combination) is statistically no different from the mean of the control group.  
To examine this further, we analyze the distributions of contributions across the 
groups. Figures 1 through 4 present histograms of the contribution amounts for the control 
and three treatment groups. As shown in Figure 1, the most frequent contribution amount 
in the control group is $20, followed closely by $0 and $50 per semester. Relative to the control 
group, Treatment 1 (Dollar Value) displays a larger percentage of low-level contributions 
                                                          
4 At the design stage, we expected both Treatment 1 and Treatment 2 to increase mean student 
contributions, and hence, Treatment 3 to perhaps increase contributions even further. Based on the 
focus groups, we expected most students in the control group would be willing to contribute $0-$10 a 
semester. Evidently, we underestimated the number of students who would be much more generous 
absent peer information. 
5 Students were randomly assigned to one of the 4 groups. 
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(Figure 2). Recall that the referenced peer contribution range in Treatment 1 is $1 per credit 
to $80 per year. Thus, individuals would likely infer that the average contribution is 
somewhere in the $20 per semester range.6 Concentrating on the upper half of the payment 
card options, it appears that Treatment 1 is “missing” a percentage of high-level contributors 
relative to the control group. It seems that many of these individuals move down to match 
the dollar amounts that are referenced for the peer institutions. There is little change in the 
$0 contribution frequency, but the $5 to $15 contribution amounts pick up many more 
individuals in Treatment 1 compared to the control group. In other words, at first glance, it 
looks like Treatment 1 (Dollar Value) changes the intensity of contributions but not the 
frequency of positive contributions. 
 Next, in Figure 3, we see that Treatment 2 (Extent of Participation) has fewer 
individuals in the lower third of the payment card options relative to the control group. Recall 
that this extent of participation treatment informs participants that 85 percent of students 
at known institutions voted for passing a green fee when put to a ballot. Participants receive 
no information on the dollar amount of the average contribution at other institutions. 
Interestingly, there is a large reduction in the number of individuals choosing to contribute 
$0 in Treatment 2 compared to the control group. Students that perhaps previously would 
have contributed $0 to a green fee may increase their contribution amount after learning of 
the high participation rates of peers. The upper end of the distribution doesn’t seem as 
different from the control. However, there may be a shift toward $50 and $100 and away from 
the contributions in the $60 to $80 range. 
Treatment 3’s (Combination Treatment) histogram looks quite similar to the control 
group and is shown in Figure 4. There may be a slight shift toward the $50 contribution 
amount relative to the control, but the overall pattern of contributions in Treatment 3 is 
visually not much different from the control. It seems that the two pieces of information may 
be effectively negating each other. Some respondents may be revising up their contributions 
while others are simultaneously revising down their contributions relative to what they 
would have done absent any information. Or, it may be that few or none of the respondents 
are revising their contributions relative to what we would have observed absent the two types 
of peer information. 
                                                          
6 Almost 100% of MLAU students are full time students, corresponding to 8-9 credit hours per 
academic year. Thus, they would likely interpret this range as about $8-$80 per year ($4-$40 per 
semester). 
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Table 3 shows the number of individuals in each group that did not contribute 
anything to the hypothetical green fee. In Treatment 2 (Extent of Participation) there are 
about half as many individuals that refuse to contribute any dollar amount compared to the 
other groups. T-tests for differences in the probability of a positive contribution confirm that 
the probability is statistically different for Treatment 2 (Extent of Participation) compared 
to the control (p-value=0.027) and Treatment 1 (Dollar Value) (p-value =0.042). 
 
5    Main Regression Results 
To further explain differences in contributions between treatments and to explore differences 
in contributions due to other systematic factors, we next turn to multiple regression analysis. 
We pool the data and use both individual characteristics and indicator variables representing 
treatment groups as independent variables for each of the regressions, where the control 
group is the comparison group. Thus, the regression equation is 
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 = 𝑋𝑖𝛽 + 𝜀𝑖 ,                (1) 
where 𝑋𝑖 is a vector containing individual characteristics and indicators for the treatments 
and 𝜀𝑖  is a normal error term for individual i. As a baseline, we present OLS results.7 
However, since we collect payment card responses for contribution levels, we have responses 
that are right-censored at $100, responses that are left-censored at $0, and interval 
observations. Thus, we employ a maximum-likelihood interval regression in addition to the 
OLS regression. 8  An OLS regression could result in biased regression coefficients and 
maximum-likelihood interval regression is more efficient than OLS regression for interval 
data. Nevertheless, it is often informative to present OLS results alongside the interval 
regression results to see how they compare (Cameron, Huppert 1989).  Here, in Table 4, we 
present only the reduced OLS and MLE regressions.9 We note that the results are similar for 
                                                          
7 For OLS regressions, contributions at the endpoints of 0 and 100 are coded at those levels. Other 
contribution amounts are coded as the mid-point of the payment card intervals. 
8 We utilize Stata’s intreg command for the interval regression. 
9 From the full model, we drop fullloadlaundry, lightingwaste, heatacwaste, drivingtrips, 
recyclepaper, and foodwaste because these are all variables that measure environmental behaviors 
and attitudes and all have p-values higher than 0.2 in the full OLS regression.  We also drop age 
because this information is already largely captured in yearinschool. Finally, we drop #roommates 
because of its high p-value and lack of theoretical relationship with the level of one’s contributions to 
a green fee. A partial F-test and Wald test confirm that the dropped variables are insignificant 
predictors of green fee contributions. Results for the full model are available upon request. 
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OLS and for the MLE interval regressions. Treatments 1 and 2 are significantly different 
from the control group in each regression.10 
Because the interval regression model is preferred for payment card data, we focus on 
interpreting those results.  We examine the significance of the indicator variables 
treatment1, treatment2, and treatment3 for evidence of information about social norms 
affecting behavior. The negative and significant sign on treatment1 agrees with what we see 
in Figure 2 compared to Figure 1. Gaining information about the dollar range of contributions 
at peer institutions causes a decrease in average contributions of about $8.09. This confirms 
what we find in the t-test for difference in means, as the difference there is $8.50. Again, the 
average contribution that participants would infer from the dollar value information falls in 
the bottom portion of the contributions that we see in the control group. So, relative to the 
control, some participants in Treatment 1 revise down their contributions to be closer to their 
newly gained perceptions of their peers. 
 The positive and significant sign on treatment2 also confirms that pattern we see in 
Figure 3 compared to Figure 1. Learning about the extent of participation in green fee 
programs at peer institutions causes an increase in average contributions of about $7.25. 
This agrees with the t-test from Section 4, where the difference is $7.10.  One explanation is 
that respondents in this treatment are now inferring that the average peer contribution is 
higher than what they would have expected prior to receiving the participation information. 
Because the perceived peer contribution exceeds a participant’s original contribution amount 
for at least a portion of the treatment group, some Treatment 2 participants increase their 
reported contribution. 
The environmental behavior variables of showertime, turnofflight, and doubleprint 
are statistically and economically significant. They also have the expected signs in that 
students who report exhibiting green behaviors are willing to contribute more to the green 
fee program.  Respondents that are more certain that their vote will influence green fee policy 
at MLAU are willing to contribute more to the green fee program. As for demographics, males 
are willing to contribute a significantly higher amount than are females. The scale of this 
difference is also quite large, estimated at around $10.51. Previous research has found a 
larger hypothetical bias in males than females, which could explain at least some of this 
                                                          
10 We also examine a specification that interacts the treatments with observable characteristics to 
investigate whether the magnitudes of Treatments 1 and 2 depend on these characteristics. 
However, none of the interaction terms are significant. 
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difference (Brown and Taylor, 2000). Interestingly, students with higher GPA’s contribute 
more as well. This may be similar to previous findings that more highly educated individuals 
are more pro-environmental in their behaviors. It is also interesting that income is not found 
to be a significant predictor of green fee contribution level. However, over 85 percent of the 
sample reports their income falls either in the “less than $2000” or “$2000-$5000” categories 
so there is not a great deal of variation to work with here.  
 
6    Selection Model Results 
There is always a concern with survey data that the sample responses may not be 
representative of the population. Furthermore, respondents who care more about the issues 
of the survey may be more likely to respond to the survey. In the context at hand, the 
contribution amounts will be biased upwards if respondents who care more about 
environmental issues are more likely to respond to the survey and are also more likely to 
contribute more to the green fee. More troublesome yet for the objectives of this study, 
students who decide to complete the survey may respond differentially to peer information 
than students who decide not to complete the survey. This could imply that we are 
overestimating or underestimating the treatment effects in the population by utilizing this 
sample. The appropriate response in this situation would be to specify a (Heckman) sample 
selection model. We typically do not have data that will allow us to do so because we do not 
typically have information about the people who declined taking the survey. However, 
fortunately in this case, we are able to gather some information about all MLAU students 
with the cooperation of the University administration. 
 We return to the regression model (equation 1) and add a selection condition, 
𝑍𝑖𝛾 + 𝜇𝑖 > 0,                  (2) 
where 𝑍𝑖 is the vector of characteristics that explain the participation decision and 𝜇𝑖 is a 
normal error term. An individual participates in the survey if the selection condition holds 
true. We observe the dependent variable (contribution amount) only for individuals that 
participate in the survey. The typical Heckman selection model then stipulates that 𝜀 and 𝜇 
have correlation 𝜌. If 𝜌 ≠ 0, estimates of equation (1) that ignore the sample selection will be 
biased. To produce consistent estimates in the presence of sample selection, one can either 
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utilize full information maximum likelihood estimation or Heckman’s (1979) two-step 
estimator of the model (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005).11  
We receive information from university administration about students’ official GPA’s, 
recorded gender, races/ethnicities, and home addresses.12 Given the home address, we create 
a regional dummy for the student’s home state using the Census Region definitions from the 
U.S. Census Bureau (2013). All states are classified according to West, Midwest, Northeast, 
and South. We therefore have five geographic regions in total when including international 
students. Ethnicity is self-identified according to the definitions for race and ethnicity of the 
Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (2013). Individuals first designate 
ethnicity as “Hispanic or Latino” or “Not Hispanic or Latino.” Then, individuals indicate one 
or more races from “American Indian or Alaska Native,” “Asian,” “Black or African 
American,” “Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander,” and “White.” Individuals can only 
fall into one of the race/ethnicity categories in the data that we have from the University 
administration so we use “White” as our comparison category for the regression analysis.  
We assume that the decision to participate in the survey is a function of the variables 
that the university has provided for all students: geographic region, official GPA, gender, and 
race/ethnicity. Identification of the Heckman selection model requires at least one variable 
in the selection equation (2) that does not appear in the regression equation (1); geographic 
region and race/ethnicity serve this purpose in our application. Significant variables in the 
selection equation include official GPA, gender, and “Black or African American.”13  We 
assume that the stated contribution to the green fee is a function of the independent variables 
from the survey that we use in the reduced regressions in Table 4.  
The typical Heckman sample selection model does not accommodate an interval 
dependent variable. However, Roodman’s (2011) cmp framework does accommodate sample 
selection with an interval dependent variable. The cmp framework is a user-written 
maximum likelihood estimator for Stata, building on seemingly unrelated regressions 
(Roodman, 2011). Analogous to Table 4, we once again present two sets of results for the 
                                                          
11 Heckman’s (1979) two-step procedure first estimates a probit model for sample inclusion and then 
includes the inverse of the Mill’s ratio in the regression equation. Stata’s maximum likelihood 
version of the Heckman model supports the Huber/White/sandwich estimator of variance and is 
hence our model of choice. The two-step results are similar and available upon request. 
12 This information is given to us in a way that does not identify the individual. 
13 First stage results from the selection equation are omitted from the table for readability but 
available upon request. 
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sample selection estimates in Table 5; Column I shows the basic MLE sample selection 
results and Column II shows the interval MLE sample selection results. The magnitudes of 
the treatment effects for Treatment 1 and Treatment 2 are similar to those from the 
corresponding columns of Table 4 and both of these treatments remain statistically 
significant at conventional levels. There is evidence in both columns that the selection 
equation is correlated with the regression equation, implying that students’ contributions are 
correlated with their probability of completing the survey. However, it does not appear that 
accounting for this self-selection leads to substantially different conclusions about the 
population parameters in this application. This is perhaps comforting to other economists 
who rely on stated preference studies using undergraduate participants. 
 
7   Conclusion 
We extend the literature on social norms with a stated preference study concerning 
contributions to student funded environmental improvement programs in the context of a 
referendum. These “green fee” programs continue to gain popularity on campuses across the 
country and are a good example of the types of referenda we see at the voting booth. We 
analyze effects on students’ stated contributions both from t-tests for differences in means 
between survey groups and maximum likelihood regressions that control for individual 
characteristics including stated environmental behaviors. Furthermore, these results are 
robust to models that controls for the self-selection of students into completing the survey. 
When soliciting support for a pro-social referendum, one might be wise to reveal only 
information regarding the participation rate of peers, given the participation rate is high. By 
revealing information about the dollar value of peer contributions, some individuals that 
previously might have been much more generous than their peers will potentially revise down 
their contributions to be more in line with those of their peers. We find that providing 
information about the range of green fee contributions from students at peer institutions 
results in a decrease in average contributions of approximately twenty five percent ($8.00) 
relative to the control group that receives no information about others’ contributions. In 
contrast, providing only information about the number of schools that have green fees and 
the percentage of students that have voted in favor of such fees results in a similarly scaled 
increase in average contributions.  
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These findings motivate several interesting unanswered questions. One important 
extension would be to establish how total contributions change in response to differential 
peer participation rates. Another important extension would be to investigate whether 
revisions in response to peer contribution dollar amounts are asymmetric. That is, for a given 
absolute divergence in ex ante contribution, perhaps individuals are more likely to revise 
down their contributions to match their peers than to revise up their contributions to match 
their peers. Or, perhaps the extent of the revision differs based upon whether the peer 
reference point is higher or lower than one’s ex ante contribution level.  
We do not have a survey design that allows us to separate conformity and reciprocity 
effects. One possible explanation for the observed behavior is that students are conforming 
to the social norm that has been established at peer institutions regardless of the equity 
implications. An alternative explanation is that students are concerned about fairness. The 
bulk of established green fees go toward energy efficiency and renewable energy production 
that have local, regional, and global impacts. In another context, perhaps the horizontal zone 
of influence of the pollutant could be helpful in separating out the conformity and reciprocity 
effects. As it is apparent that reciprocity or conformity or both are present in stated 
contribution levels, it would be interesting to pose a series of questions to respondents to 
tease out their motivations for giving. Similarly, it would be interesting to see if students 
react differently to information about peers at their own institutions versus peers at other 
places of higher education. 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics, n=559 
Variable Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max 
contribution 31.816 27.98 0 100 
showertime 12.397 5.703 2.5 25 
fullloadlaundry 0.889 0.314 0 1 
turnofflight 0.893 0.310 0 1 
lightingwaste 6.299 2.088 1 10 
heatacwaste 5.637 2.282 1 10 
drivingtrips 1.934 3.337 0 13.5 
recyclepaper 0.800 0.401 0 1 
foodwaste 12.688 12.464 5 87.5 
doubleprint 0.274 0.446 0 1 
greenwork 0.458 0.499 0 1 
certainty 4.018 2.622 0 10 
age 19.742 1.294 17 23 
male 0.326 0.469 0 1 
international 0.088 0.283 0 1 
athletic 0.186 0.389 0 1 
yearinschool 2.494 1.117 1 4 
economics 0.109 0.312 0 1 
environmental 
studies 0.029 0.167 0 1 
science 0.360 0.480 0 1 
socialscience 0.356 0.479 0 1 
humanities 0.150 0.358 0 1 
arts 0.068 0.252 0 1 
sports management 0.021 0.145 0 1 
liveoncampus 0.891 0.312 0 1 
#roommates 2.138 1.591 0 5 
gpa 3.371 0.429 1.83 3.83 
income ($ 1000’s) 3.979 9.440 1 100 
treatment1 0.193 0.395 0 1 
treatment2 0.202 0.402 0 1 
treatment3 0.215 0.411 0 1 
control 0.390 0.389 0 1 
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Table 2: T-tests for Differences in Mean Contributions. 
  
Group 
  Control 
Treatment 1 
(Dollar 
Value) 
Treatment 2 
(Extent of 
Participation) 
Treatment 3 
(Combination) 
Mean Contribution 31.83 23.33*** 38.94** 32.71 
Standard Deviation 28.52 24.26 29.14 27.29 
Treatment Mean – 
Control Mean 
- -8.50 7.10 0.873 
n 218 108 113 120 
t-stat - -2.81 2.12 0.277 
p-value - 0.0054 0.0353 0.782 
 Note: *Significant at 10%, **Significant at 5%, ***Significant at 1%. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: Prevalence of $0 Contributions 
Group # of $0 Contributions (% of Group) 
Control 34 (15.6) 
Treatment 1 (Dollar Value) 17 (15.74) 
Treatment 2 (Extent of Participation) 8 (7.08)** 
Treatment 3 (Combination) 14 (11.67) 
Note: *Significant at 10%, **Significant at 5%, ***Significant 
at 1%. 
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Table 4: Reduced Regression Model Results 
  I. OLS II. MLE 
treatment1 (Dollar Value) -6.833 ** -8.085 ** 
 (2.866)  (3.478)  
treatment2 (Extent of Participation) 5.877 * 7.247 * 
 (3.252)  (3.803)  
treatment3 (Combination) 1.228  1.428  
 (2.939)  (3.471)  
showertime -0.408 * -0.490 * 
 (0.213)  (0.259)  
turnofflight 6.167 * 8.008 * 
 (3.606)  (4.415)  
doubleprint 8.124 *** 9.784 *** 
 (2.690)  (3.096)  
greenwork 3.929 * 4.414  
 (2.312)  (2.743)  
certainty 2.240 *** 2.874 *** 
 (0.453)  (0.537)  
male 9.625 *** 10.507 *** 
 (2.745)  (3.271)  
international -7.444 * -6.737  
 (4.181)  (4.913)  
athlete -4.267  -5.224 * 
 (2.640)  (3.111)  
yearinschool 1.244  1.373  
 (1.125)  (1.276)  
science 8.953 *** 10.223 *** 
 (3.332)  (3.808)  
socialscience 5.129  5.203  
 (3.315)  (3.764)  
sports management -13.955 *** -17.326 *** 
 (4.707)  (6.664)  
liveoncampus -3.841  -3.842  
 (3.818)  (4.488)  
gpa survey 4.812 * 5.570 * 
 (2.644)  (3.163)  
income -0.130  -0.191  
 (0.114)  (0.163)  
constant -4.032  -10.446  
  (12.570)   (14.494)   
F/W Test Statistic 7.92  142.31  
R-Squared 0.19    
Sigma 25.69  29.64  
AIC 5226.77  3185.05  
n 559  559  
Partial F/W Statistic 0.75  7.13  
Note: *Significant at 10%, **Significant at 5%, ***Significant at 1%.  
Robust Standard Errors are in Parentheses. Insignificant majors are 
omitted from the table for readability. 
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Table 5: Reduced Regression Results, Selection Models 
  I. Heckman MLE II. Interval MLE (CMP) 
treatment1 (Dollar Value) -6.824 ** -8.080 ** 
 (2.812)  (3.477)  
treatment2 (Extent of Participation) 5.892 * 7.257 * 
 (3.176)  (3.792)  
treatment3 (Combination) 1.269  1.467  
 (2.893)  (3.484)  
showertime -0.401 * -0.482 * 
 (0.209)  (0.259)  
turnofflight 6.288 * 8.127 * 
 (3.520)  (4.401)  
doubleprint 8.235 *** 9.907 *** 
 (2.639)  (3.104)  
greenwork 3.963 * 4.442  
 (2.267)  (2.743)  
certainty 2.241 *** 2.871 *** 
 (0.445)  (0.538)  
male 11.327 *** 12.266 *** 
 (2.862)  (3.590)  
international -6.650  -5.906  
 (4.086)  (4.884)  
athlete -4.357 * -5.298 * 
 (2.580)  (3.102)  
yearinschool 1.019  1.137  
 (1.114)  (1.301  
science 9.166 *** 10.451 *** 
 (3.266)  (3.814)  
sports management -13.911 *** -17.309 *** 
 (4.652)  (6.674)  
liveoncampus -4.087  -4.097  
 (3.740)  (4.490)  
gpa survey 2.900  3.578  
 (2.654)  (3.324)  
income -0.116  -0.178  
 (0.113)  (0.163)  
constant 9.970  4.022  
  (13.161)   (16.669)   
F/W Test Statistic 179.31  245.55  
Sigma 25.85  30.27  
Wald Test for Indep. Eqns. (p-value) 0.0079  0.108  
AIC 7402.821  5348.928  
Note: *Significant at 10%, **Significant at 5%, ***Significant at 1%.  n=1817.                                                                     
Robust Standard Errors are in Parentheses. Insignificant majors are omitted from the table for 
readability. 
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Appendix A 
Variables collected in the survey include: 
contribution—the dollar amount per semester selected for the green fee referendum 
showertime—average shower time in minutes 
fullloadlaundry—how full the laundry machine typically is run (1=full, 0=less than full) 
turnofflight—turned off light last time you left an empty room (1=yes, 0=no) 
lightingwaste—perceived lighting waste at MLAU (1=minimum waste, 10=maximum waste) 
heatacwaste—perceived heating and a/c waste at MLAU (1=minimum waste, 10=maximum waste) 
drivingtrips—the number of weekly driving trips 
recyclepaper—recycle used paper (1=always yes, usually yes, or sometimes yes, 0=no) 
foodwaste—from the amount of food taken, what percentage is typically thrown in the garbage 
doubleprint—use of double printing option in library (1=yes, 0=no) 
greenwork—current or past involvement in environmental groups/volunteer activities (1=yes , 0=no ) 
certainty—level of certainty that vote will influence green fee policy at MLAU (0=minimum confidence, 
10=maximum confidence) 
age—age in years 
male—gender (male=1, female=0) 
international—international student (1=yes, 0=no) 
athlete—athlete on an MLAU team (1=yes, 0=no) 
yearinschool—academic standing (1=Freshman, 2=Sophomore, 3=Junior, 4=Senior) 
major (some students have more than one major)—economics/business; environmental studies; 
science; social science; humanities; arts/music; sports management 
liveoncampus—lives on campus (1=yes, 0=no) 
#roommates—number of roommates 
GPA survey—grade point average on a 4.0 scale self-reported on survey 
income—2011 personal income (including gifts, not including money used for tuition/educational fees) 
treatment1—dollar value treatment (1=yes, 0=no) 
treatment2—extent of participation treatment (1=yes, 0=no) 
treatment3—combination treatment (1=yes, 0=no) 
